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In this paper we assess the critical factors of Value Added Tax 
revenues in the European Union, by using a panel data of the 
27 countries, between 1998 and 2011. Our findings show that 
EU governments have been using tax rates increases to collect 
more revenues, both at the normal and the minimum rate. It 
was also found that an increase in the implicit rate increases 
revenues as well. Tax administration efficiency and experience 
is a critical factor for the capacity to collect VAT revenues. A 
better legal and institutional environment is shown to be 
related with higher revenues. Finally, countries in the 
Eurozone are shown to have higher revenues, mainly due to 
the fiscal rules that they are subject to. Higher income, as 
measured by GDP per capita, increases revenues, on account 
of the higher propensity for consumption.   
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Value Added Tax (VAT) can be defined as being “a broad-based business tax imposed at each stage 
of the production and distribution process which, when applied nationally, is typically designed to 
tax final household consumption” (Tait, Ebel, & Le, 2005, p. 461). 
VAT has become more and more relevant in the tax systems around the world, and more than 
140 countries using it to tax consumption, which represents over 20% of tax revenues (Keen, 
2009). However, particularly in the European Union (EU), VAT is one of the main source of public 
revenues. Looking at data from 2011, VAT revenues represented around 7% of GDP, both for the 
European Union and the Eurozone, from a total taxation (including social security contributions) 
of around 38% of GDP (Eurostat, 2013). According to the same source, total taxation, excluding 
social security contributions, represents around 26% of GDP. This means that, in the EU, VAT 
represents almost a third of all tax collection. As indirect taxes revenues represent around 13% of 
GDP, VAT accounts for more than half of this. In the EU, only personal income taxes have a higher 
value than VAT, representing 9% of GDP. Corporate taxes revenues represent just 2.5% of GDP. 
Despite the relevance of VAT in tax revenues and the increased pressure of fiscal constraints in 
increasing public revenues, little economic research has been carried out on VAT revenues, 
particularly at the European level. As far as we know, no paper addresses the main determinants 
of VAT revenues in Europe. Some literature exists with databases covering OECD and non-OECD 
countries, measuring both the decision to adopt VAT, and the impact of VAT on revenues (Bogetic 
& Hassan, 1993, for a panel data of OECD and non-OECD countries, with data for a single year: 
1988; Legeida & Sologoub, 2003 for Ukraine; Keen & Lockwood, 2010 for a panel of 143 countries 
for 25 years, focusing on the impact on adopting VAT rates and VAT revenues; Addison & Levin, 
2011 for sub-Saharan Africa; Kaczyńska, 2015, for Poland). These studies found a positive impact 
on revenues from VAT rates, VAT base, economic openness, and administration efficiency; and a 
negative impact from the agriculture share of GDP, the use of several tax rates, and exemptions.  
This paper addresses the issue regarding what are the main determinants of VAT revenues in the 
European Union. For this purpose, we collected data on the VAT revenues in billions of Euros (and 
then use the log function) and in percentage of GDP.  We aim to assess the impact on VAT 
revenues from tax administration efficiency and experience, from the level of VAT rates, from the 
level of imports and services in the GDP, from the fiscal position and the participation in the 
Eurozone, and also from the country’s legal environment. We divided the variables into four 
groups: 1) VAT variables (VAT rate, minimum rate and implicit rate); 2) Economic variables 
(imports, services and fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP); 3) Tax administration efficiency 
(measure by VAT C-efficiency, by the number of years of VAT application, and by Government 
efficiency); 4) Legal and institutional environment (measure by the level of corruption and the rule 
of law). We then added two control variables: whether the country is a member of the Eurozone, 
and the log of GDP per capita. 




We found a positive relationship between VAT rates and the amount of revenues, which shows 
that, over the last years, countries have increased their tax rates in the face of fiscal constraints. 
Tax administration efficiency also plays an important role in the capacity of governments to collect 
revenues. A better legal and institutional environment tends to increase revenues. Countries in the 
Eurozone are more likely to have higher revenues, which could be explained by the fact that they 
are more subject to tight fiscal rules. A higher income, measured by GDP per capita, tends to 
produce more VAT revenues, which could be explained by the marginal propensity for 
consumption, particularly for goods and services subject to the normal rate. 
This paper is novel with regards to previous literature in several aspects: first, it is the only study, 
to our knowledge, that specifically addresses VAT revenues in the European Union and the 
Eurozone context. Particularly important is the fact that we compared only European Union 
countries, their VAT rates and tax administrations, and their economic, legal and institutional 
environment. Second, with exception of the study by Keen & Lockwood (2010), all recent studies 
have focused on a single country. Third, with regards to the study mentioned, we address different 
questions. Whereas Keen & Lockwood (2010) study the impact on revenues from adopting VAT 
and the impact of the VAT on the effectiveness of the tax system, we focus on what are the main 
determinants of VAT revenues. We also innovate by considering new variables, such as corruption, 
rule of law, and tax administration efficiency measures.            
This paper is organized as follow: Chapter 2 presents a literature review on VAT revenues studies. 
Data and methodology are presented in Chapter 3 and results in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes.    
Literature review  
Despite the importance and popularity of VAT as a way of taxing consumption and of increasing 
public revenues, there is little academic literature on the subject (Keen, 2009). VAT has been 
adopted by all the European Union countries (VAT is mandatory, see for instance De La Feria et 
al., 2010, Cnossen, 2011), and also in almost all African and Latin America countries (Tait, 1989; 
Williams, 1996; Bird & Gendron, 2007; Keen, 2009). In the developing world, it has also been seen 
as a source of change in tax and economic policy (Ebrill et al., 2001; Bird & Gendron, 2007; Keen, 
2009, Keen & Lockwood, 2010).  The introduction of VAT over the past few decades has been the 
most visible tax reform undertaken by developing countries (Tanzi & Zee, 2000). There is some 
evidence, particularly in the Third World, that those countries that have adopted VAT raise more 
revenues (Keen & Lockwood, 2010).  
The popularity of VAT comes from several sources, one being its potential scope for identifying 
and taxing the economic contribution - or added value - made by any activity of a business or 
commercial nature (Williams, 1996). The other issue regards its relative simplicity, with an invoice-
credit mechanism for collection (Mello, 2008, 2009). There is also the issue of it being economic 
neutral, and the fact that it is a powerful tool for economic stabilisation (Lindholm, 1970). Finally, 




several authors point out VAT’s efficiency and its high impact on collecting revenues. It is 
sometimes referred to as a “cash machine” (Keen & Lockwood, 2006, 2010), but, as with any tax, 
it is vulnerable to tax evasion, particularly “carrousel fraud” (Keen & Smith, 2006; van Brederode, 
2008; Sergiou, 2012). 
The Economic literature on taxation has been mainly focused on the optimal design of tax systems 
and tax evasion (see Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010, for a review of tax research, Slemrod, 1990 for the 
optimal tax system issue, and Dharmapala, 2014 for tax evasion). However, there is less literature 
on the main determinants of tax revenues, and particularly on VAT revenues. 
One of the first studies on the determinants of VAT revenues was carried out by Bogetic & Hassan 
(1993). Using a sample of 34 countries, they found that the key variables influencing VAT revenue 
performance were: tax rate, tax base (i.e, if VAT applies to all goods and service, or there is some 
exceptions), and tax rate dispersion. The first two increase tax revenues, whereas the last tends 
to reduce it. Bogetic & Hassan also found that countries with a single VAT rate tend to have more 
revenues than countries with several rates. The positive impact of tax rates on VAT revenues was 
also evidenced in Shoup et al. (1990). There is also evidence that VAT tax base has an impact on 
VAT revenues (Kay & Davids, 1990). In the case of the negative impact of several tax rates, Bogetic 
& Hassan (1993) confirms the previous results of Tait (1988). Similar results were latterly obtained 
by Legeida (2003). 
Godin & Hindriks (2015), using a database covering 203 countries with 40 tax items over the period 
1980-2010, assess some of the main determinants of tax collection. The authors found a positive 
effect on tax revenues from economic growth, government efficiency, and trade openness, along 
with the size of tax rates. On the contrary, trade taxes and a higher share of agriculture in GDP 
decreases the amount of tax revenues. Another study, by Keen and Lockwood (2010), used a panel 
set of 143 countries over 26 years. The authors analysed what leads countries to adopt VAT, and 
the impact of VAT on tax revenues. Their study concludes that, in the long run, VAT is associated 
with an increase in tax revenues. They found several positive determinants of VAT revenues, 
namely: income per capita, the openness of the economy, and the size of the younger population. 
On the contrary, countries were agriculture has a higher share of GDP tend to have less revenues. 
Keen (2009) also found evidence of the negative impact of exemptions and the use of reduced 
rates on revenues. The fact that trade also has a positive impact on VAT revenues was also 
concluded by Rodrick (1998) and Hines & Desai (2005). Similar results were found for sub-Saharan 
Africa by Addison & Levin (2011). 
Data and methodology 
The objective of this paper is to assess the main determinants of VAT revenues. For this purpose, 
we collected as our first dependent variable - annual VAT revenue in billions of Euros - for a panel 
data of 27 EU countries, for a period between 1998 and 2011. For the Eurozone countries, data is 




available directly from Eurostat (2013). For the non-Eurozone countries, we first collected from 
Eurostat (2013) the value of VAT revenues as a percentage of GDP, and then multiplied that value 
for the country’s GDP in billions of Euros. This last information is available at AMECO, the 
European Commission’s online database. For the robustness check, we used a second dependent 
variable - VAT revenue as a percentage of GDP, which is also available from Eurostat (2013). 
We study VAT revenues by means of the following model (we run OLS with fixed effects, and also, 
in the case of the second dependent variable, a GLM): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐺𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 
Where: 
Yit stands for our dependent variable (log of VAT revenues) or, for control of robustness of our 
model, our second dependent variable - VAT revenue as a percentage of GDP. i and t are country 
and time indicators respectively. 
The main determinants were divided into the following categories: variables regarding Value Added 
Tax, in order to assess how changes in VAT rates affect revenues; variables regarding the economic 
environment, in order to analyse the impact of economic conditions in collecting revenues, and; 
institutional variables. For the latter, we have variables regarding how tax administration efficiency 
increases VAT revenues, and also variables concerning the impact of the legal and political 
environment of each country on VAT revenues. 
For the VAT variables, we expect normal statutory rate and implicit rate to increase tax revenues. 
We use the following variables:  
VATrate represents the normal statutory VAT rate for each year, in each country. Data was 
collected from Eurostat (2015). Naturally, increases in VAT rate are expected to increase revenues 
(see several studies regarding the impact of VAT rates on revenues: Engel et al., 2001; Pagan et al., 
2001 and regarding the impact of the standard VAT rate in revenues: Ebrill et al., 2001; Matthews, 
2003; Bikas & Rashkauskas, 2011). Therefore, we expect this variable to be positively related with 
VAT revenues.  
minrate referees to the minimum statutory rate used in each country for the designed period. VAT 
directives allow countries to choose which services and products (usually related with social issues) 
have a lower VAT rate than the normal rate. Data was collected from Eurostat (2015). The 
literature tends to consider that a minimum rate tends to increase the consumption of the 
abovementioned products, creating a positive price-elasticity (see for instance Zee, 1995; Creedy 
et al., 2004; Booters et al, 2010). We expect minimum rate to have a negative impact on VAT 
revenue, as it represents an erosion of the tax base.  




Implicitrate represents the implicit VAT rate of each country, in each year of our sample. This is the 
effective VAT rate, measured according to Eurostat (2013) as the total VAT revenues divided by 
the tax base (in this case consumption). It could be argued that this is the value of a single VAT tax 
rate that would provide the same revenue as the current VAT rates in each country. Furthermore, 
Eurostat (2013) refers that implicit rates are computed as being the ratio of total tax revenues of 
the category (either consumption, labour, or capital taxes) to a proxy of the potential tax base, 
defined using the production and income accounts of the national accounts. A higher tax is 
associated with higher revenues, despite the negative impact that it can have on private 
consumption (Alm et al., 2013). 
Regarding the economic variables, we expect good economic times to have, naturally, a positive 
impact on VAT revenues. We used the following variables:  
Imports represents the imports of the country as a percentage of GDP. Data was collected from 
AMECO. Imports are associated with more revenues, as VAT is charged by Customs. However, 
in this case, for most of the countries, the majority of the imports are from inside the European 
Union, and therefore, we do not anticipate a clear signal from this variable.  
Services represents the proportion of services in the GDP (as a percentage). Data was collected 
from AMECO, and it has a higher component of added value, and is expected to increase revenues.  
Deficit represents the government fiscal deficit, in the national accounts. Data was collected from 
AMECO. We do not have a predefined signal for this variable. Higher deficits can be the result of 
lower tax revenues, but they can also cause an increase in tax rates, leading to higher revenues. 
We also expect tax administration efficiency to have a positive impact on revenues. To measure 
this efficiency, we used the following: 
Ceffic stands for the C-efficiency of VAT for each country, for each year of the sample. C-efficiency 
is a wider and broadly used efficiency measure for VAT. C-efficiency is an indicator of the departure 
of VAT from a perfectly enforced tax, which is levied at a uniform rate on all consumption (Keen, 
2013). C-efficiency is calculated by VAT revenues divided by the value of the consumption, which 
is divided again by the normal VAT rate. The data used to calculate C-efficiency was collected from 
Eurostat (2013) for VAT revenues, and from AMECO for consumption values, and Eurostat (2015) 
for normal rate VAT. This indicator has been used in the literature to understand the determinants 
of VAT compliance (Gebauer et al., 2007; Aizenman & Jinjarak, 2008; De Mello, 2009), and to 
analyse and compare the level of VAT evasion across countries (Jack, 1996; Bird & Gendron, 2007; 
OECD, 2008), and also in several countries, across time (Hybka, 2009). Using a sample of several 
European countries, Keen (2013), found that changes in VAT revenues have been driven much less 
by changes in standard rates, than by changes in ‘C-efficiency’. A higher value in C-efficiency means 
a more efficient tax administration for collecting revenues and for fighting tax evasion. It is also 
important to stress that VAT tends to lead to less tax evasion than other taxes, mainly due to the 




invoice-credit mechanism used for its collection (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod & Itzhaki, 
2002; Mello, 2009). There is some agreement in the literature, that indirect taxes are easier to 
administrate (Piccolino et al., 2014). Increasing tax administration efficiency and enforcement 
spending have a positive impact in reducing tax evasion (Engel et al., 2001). Therefore, we expect 
this variable to have a positive coefficient, as a higher efficiency in collecting taxes is associated with 
lower tax evasion, and naturally, with higher revenues.  
nyearsVAT represents the number of years since VAT was introduced in each country. Data was 
collected from Eurostat (2015) and it was found that more experience is related with better tax 
compliance, and thus with greater efficiency and lower tax evasion (Agha & Haughton, 1996; Ebrill 
et al., 2001; Aizenman & Jinjarak, 2008). Thus, we expect this variable to have a positive coefficient.  
Geffic is an indicator of government efficiency. This is a dynamic variable, which ranges from 0 to 
10 (with 10 being the highest level of efficiency in the government), and it was collected from the 
World Bank. However, for each country and year, we used the quartile positions of each country 
in the index. Godin & Hindriks (2015) found evidence of a positive relationship between better 
government and transparency and the overall performance of government tax collection. We used 
this variable as a proxy for tax administration efficiency. As mentioned by Tanzi & Zee (2000) and 
Cnossen (2015), a complex tax system, in terms of tax rates, brackets, exemptions and deductions, 
is generally less efficient. We expect more efficient governments to be more able to reduce tax 
evasion and to collect revenues. Therefore, we expect this variable to be positive.  
To measure a country’s legal and institutional quality (we expect this to have a positive impact on 
the collection of tax revenues), we used the following variables:  
LowCorr represents the corruption level of each country, for each year, measured by the World 
Bank. The index is a dynamic variable ranging from 0 to 10 (with 10 being the lowest corruption). 
Once again, we used the quartile positions of each country in the index. Corruption should 
decrease tax revenues, either by increasing the size of the shadow economy (Bird, 2008; 
Braşoveanu et al., 2009; Sokolovska, 2015), or by reducing the efficiency of tax administration. 
Therefore, as this index increases when corruption is reduced, we expect a positive coefficient 
(i.e.: an increase in the index means less corruption, and therefore more revenues).  
Rlaw represents the level of the rule of law. The index is a dynamic variable, ranging from 0 to 10 
(with 10 being the highest level of rule of law), collected from the World Bank. Once again, we 
used the quartile positions of each country in the index. This represents the quality and strength 
of the legal system, and it shows the judicial limits of government to realize their policy programme 
through the legislative arm of government. Better enforcement is expected to increase revenues. 
For control purpose, we add the following independent variables: 
Euro is a dummy that equals 0 if the country did not belong to the Eurozone in that year, and 1 if 
it did belong to it. As Eurozone countries have been subject to more fiscal constraints, mainly from 




the Stability and Growth Pact (Buti, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2007; Dworak et al., 2002; Heipertz, 2004; 
Afonso, 2010, Hernández et al., 2013), we expect an increase in tax revenues.  
LogofGDPpercapita is the log-function of GDP per capita. Higher GDP per capita should increase 
revenues. This increase is due to the propensity to consumption of wealthier people, particularly 
in goods and services subject to the normal tax rate. Several authors have showed that higher GDP 
per capita (using the log values) is associated with higher VAT efficiency and VAT revenues (Ebrill 
et al., 2001; Cizek et al., 2012; Alm et al., 2013; Zidkova, 2014 and Godin & Hindricks, 2015). 
Table 1 exhibits their descriptive statistics. The correlation matrix and the VIF test shows 
multicollinearity between the three variables from the World Bank (corruption, rule of law, and 
government efficiency), which we used separated in each model. There is also multi-collinearity 
between the normal VAT rate and the implicit rate (as expected). The Breusch–Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis. The Jarque-Bera test on variables’ normality is 
statistically significant, and thus we can safely consider that the data have a normal distribution. The 
Ramsey test did not show any omitted variable. There is some evidence of dependent variable 
normality of data in Figures 1 and 2. Data for each country in the sample is presented in Table 2. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Log VATrev 365 2.20 1.70 -1.88 5.25 
VATrevGDP 365 7.48 1.17 4.14 10.9 
Explanatory variables 
VAT variables 
VAT rate 365 19.66 2.96 8 25 
Minrate 365 5.78 3.24 0 17 
Implicitrate 365 21.2 4.34 11.1 34.2 
Economic variables 
ImportsGDP 365 54.2 27.2 21.1 158.6 
ServicesGDP 365 50.1 25.9 0.19 10.5.7 
Deficit 365 3.09 3.53 -6.83 15.4 
Tax administration efficiency 
Ceffic 365 50.3 9.36 30.8 86.7 
nyearsVAT 365 22.7 11.8 1 45 
GovefficQ 365 82.9 13.5 28.3 100 
Institutional and legal variables 
LowCorruptionQ 365 80.1 15.4 30.2 100 
RuleofLawQ 365 82.1 14.7 37.3 100 
Control variables 
Euro 365 0.50 0.5 0 1 
LogGDPcapita 365 3.39 1.39 0.50 7.94 
Source: The Author 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 





Mean Sd Min Max Median Mean Sd Min Max Median
Belgium 20.9 3.37 15.4 25.98 20.74 6.98 0.13 6.74 7.18 7
Bulgaria 2.24 1.03 0.96 3.86 2.19 9.12 1.12 7.31 10.9 8.87
Czech Republic 6.91 2.72 3.36 10.94 6.82 6.49 0.41 5.87 7.04 6.36
Denmark 20.06 3.20 15.18 23.87 20.06 9.9 0.26 9.57 10.39 9.82
Germany 152.75 21.09 128.37 191.19 139.91 6.77 0.41 6.26 7.48 6.73
Estonia 0.91 0.38 0.41 1.42 0.86 8.39 0.44 7.68 9.07 8.41
Ireland 10.13 2.68 5.59 14.4 10.08 7.05 0.48 6.15 7.77 7.08
Greece 15.8 0.96 14.91 17.02 15.67 7.15 0.36 6.45 7.44 7.25
Spain 49.14 10.70 30.86 64.35 49.37 5.81 0.62 4.14 6.53 5.97
France 121.89 13.81 101.21 140.84 123.42 7.27 0.24 6.91 7.75 7.25
Italy 84.4 10.33 66.16 98.6 83.42 6.08 0.21 5.69 6.47 6.1
Cyprus 1.1 0.50 0.39 1.82 1.15 7.83 2.07 4.48 10.59 8.4
Latvia 0.98 0.41 0.48 1.73 0.9 7.19 0.71 5.99 8.59 7.04
Lithuania 1.9 0.55 1.11 2.59 1.96 7.46 0.60 6.44 8.11 7.57
Luxembourg 1.78 0.56 0.96 2.63 1.76 5.94 0.37 5.37 6.71 5.8
Hungary 6.45 1.81 3.3 8.44 7.05 8.25 0.43 7.6 8.86 8.18
Malta 0.35 0.11 0.15 0.53 0.37 6.81 1.16 4.35 8.05 7.34
Netherlands 35.97 6.16 24.31 43.22 36.38 7.15 0.21 6.76 7.5 7.22
Austria 19.36 2.49 15.58 23.33 19 7.96 0.21 7.62 8.37 7.95
Poland 19.28 6.83 10.92 29.94 16.95 7.52 0.49 6.77 8.34 7.46
Portugal 11.79 2.16 7.98 14.42 11.77 7.85 0.49 7.1 8.56 7.73
Romania 6.08 3.46 2.04 11.41 5.26 7.2 0.85 6.05 8.69 7.14
Slovenia 2.44 0.53 1.67 3.17 2.39 8.51 0.10 8.27 8.61 8.52
Slovakia 2.88 1.22 1.31 4.7 2.83 7.12 0.44 6.35 7.87 6.98
Finland 13.18 2.25 9.64 16.84 13.3 8.45 0.25 7.98 8.93 8.44
Sweden 26.81 4.87 19.86 36.41 26.21 9.02 0.35 8.6 9.67 8.9
United Kingdom 113.15 15.28 84.48 135.97 113.8 6.58 0.34 5.7 7.34 6.58
VAT Revenue Rate in Bill ion €
Country
VAT Revenues as % GDP
  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in this study. 
Source: The Author 
Table 2 – Country data 











        Source: The Author 








            
Source: The Author 
Figure 2 – Histogram of the variable Log of VAT RevenueVAT revenue as % of GDP 
Results and discussion 
For a comparative to assess and evaluate the main determinants of VAT revenues, we estimate an 
OLS with fixed effects (due to the Hausmann test), using the log of the VAT revenues as a dependent 
variable. Results are shown in Table 3. A robustness check was performed, adding a variable Euro 
to the model and a variable log of GDP per capita. Results of this new model are shown in Table 4. 
Later, we run these models with our second dependent variable (VAT revenue as a % of GDP), as a 
robustness for our results. Table 5 presents the first model, and Table 6 shows the model with the 
two control variables already mentioned. This subsection addresses conclusions from all models.  




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES logVATrev logVATrev logVATrev logVATrev 
VAT variables 
VAT rate 0.0355*** 0.0352*** 0.0351***  
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0052)  
Minrate 0.0331*** 0.0332*** 0.0252*** 0.0330*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
implicitrate    0.0250*** 
    (0.0056) 
Economic variables 
Imports%GDP -0.0043*** -0.0046*** -0.0034*** -0.0043*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Services%GDP 0.0063*** 0.0061*** 0.0052*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Deficit -0.0037* -0.0034 -0.0055*** -0.0041* 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
Tax administration efficiency 
Ceffic 0.0308*** 0.0313*** 0.0280*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0020) 
nyearsVAT 0.0566*** 0.0565*** 0.0550*** 0.0580*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0021) 
GovefficQ  0.0042**   
  (0.0018)   
Institutional and legal variables 
Low CorruptionQ 0.0051***    
 (0.0019)    
RuleoflawQ   0.0159***  
   (0.0020)  
Constant -2.0074*** -1.9369*** -2.6619*** -1.0048*** 
 (0.2350) (0.2307) (0.2104) (0.1320) 
     
Observations 365 365 365 365 
R-squared 0.8855 0.8849 0.9019 0.8762 
Number of Country 27 27 27 27 
This table presents the results of an OLS with fixed effects (due to the Hausmann test results). 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of VAT revenues in millions of Euros (for non-Eurozone 
countries, values in national currencies were converted to Euros), for 1998 to 2011. Country 
effects were used, but were omitted. Variables CorruptionQ, GovefficQ, RuleoflawQ and 
implictrate were used separated, due to multicollinearity. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** stands for p<0.01, ** stands for p<0.05, and * for 
p<0.1. 
Source: The Author 
Table 3 – Regression results with dependent variable LogVATrevenues 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES logVATrev logVATrev logVATrev logVATrev 
VAT variables 
VAT rate 0.0430*** 0.0426*** 0.0417***  
 (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033)  
Minrate 0.0085*** 0.0086*** 0.0064** 0.0056** 
 (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
implicitrate    0.0363*** 
    (0.0035) 
Economic variables 
Imports%GDP -0.0039*** -0.0038*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Services%GDP 0.0130*** 0.0131*** 0.0124*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Deficit -0.0035*** -0.0037*** -0.0046*** -0.0045*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Tax Administration efficiency 
Ceffic 0.0249*** 0.0246*** 0.0237*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) 
nyearsVAT 0.0217*** 0.0231*** 0.0251*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
GovefficQ  -0.0004   
  (0.0011)   
Institutional and legal variables 
Low CorruptionQ  0.0031**    
 (0.0012)    
RuleoflawQ   0.0066***  
   (0.0014)  
Control variables 
Euro 0.1048*** 0.1117*** 0.1080*** 0.1101*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0238) (0.0259) 
logGDPpercapita 0.6162*** 0.5962*** 0.5541*** 0.6091*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0276) 
Constant -2.7618*** -2.9407*** -3.3138*** -2.3694*** 
 (0.1472) (0.1494) (0.1393) (0.1026) 
Observations 365 365 365 365 
R-squared 0.9574 0.9566 0.9595 0.9520 
Number of Country 27 27 27 27 
This table presents the results of our robustness checks, using an OLS with fixed effects, with the 
dependent variable being the logarithm of the VAT revenues in millions of Euros (for non-Eurozone 
countries, values in national currencies were converted to Euros), for 1998 to 2011. Country effects 
were used, but were omitted. The following variables were introduced in the model for control 
purposes: Euro (a dummy variable, whether the country belongs to the Eurozone or not), and a 
variable with the log of the GDP per capita. Variables CorruptionQ, GovefficQ, RuleoflawQ and 
implictrate were used separated, due to multicollinearity. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** stands for p<0.01, ** stands for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
Source: The Author 
Table 4 – Robustness check log of VAT Revenue 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VATrevGDP VATrevGDP VATrevGDP VATrevGDP 
VAT variables 
VAT rate 0.3513*** 0.3490*** 0.3495***  
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143)  
Minrate -0.0075 -0.0083 -0.0088 -0.0270* 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0141) 
implicitrate    0.2629*** 
    (0.0184) 
Economic variables 
Imports%GDP -0.0156*** -0.0157*** -0.0152*** -0.0136*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0037) 
Services%GDP 0.0006 0.0013 0.0005 -0.0033 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0057) 
Deficit -0.0098* -0.0104* -0.0109* -0.0175** 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0073) 
VAT Administration efficiency 
Ceffic 0.1278*** 0.1271*** 0.1265*** 0.0378*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0071) 
nyearsVAT 0.0271*** 0.0334*** 0.0327*** 0.0480*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0102) 
GovefficQ  0.0052   
  (0.0047)   
Institutional and legal variables 
Low CorruptionQ  0.0087*    
 (0.0052)    
RuleoflawQ   0.0044  
   (0.0058)  
Control variables 
Euro 0.2761*** 0.2834*** 0.2914*** 0.2865** 
 (0.1022) (0.1023) (0.1021) (0.1344) 
logGDPpercapita -0.0614 -0.1388 -0.1477 -0.0445 
 (0.1133) (0.1092) (0.1140) (0.1433) 
Constant -4.8251*** -5.7820*** -5.6284*** 0.0055 
 (0.6139) (0.6186) (0.5973) (0.5333) 
Observations 365 365 365 365 
R-squared 0.8208 0.8200 0.8196 0.6863 
Number of Country 27 27 27 27 
This table presents the results of ours robustness checks, using an OLS with fixed effects with the 
dependent variable being the logarithm of VAT revenues in millions of Euros (for non-Eurozone 
countries, other values were converted to Euros), for 1998 to 2011. The following variables were 
introduced for control purposes: Euro (a dummy, whether the country belongs to the Eurozone or 
not), and the log of the GDP per capita. Variables CorruptionQ, GovefficQ, RuleoflawQ and 
implictrate were used separated, due to multicollinearity.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** stands for p<0.01, ** stands for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1.  
Source: the Author 
Table 6 - Robustness check VAT Revenue as percentage of GDP 




As expected, we found evidence of a positive impact in revenues from increasing the normal 
statutory rate. In average, an increase in 1 p.p. in the statutory rate increased VAT revenues by 0.4 
p.p. of GDP. An increase in the implicit rate represents, on average, an increase of 0.2 p.p. in 
revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
Up until the financial crisis of 2008, we found that normal rate had increased by an average of 0.4 
p.p., from an average of 18.9% in 1998, to an average of 19.3% in 2007. After 2008, the fiscal 
constraints and the need of most European countries to reduce their deficits, led most countries 
to use VAT as one of their measures to increase revenues. In many cases, countries opted not only 
to increase the tax base, but also to increase tax rates. After the crisis, normal rates have increased, 
in average by 2.2 p.p.., from an average of 19.3% in 2007, to an average of 21.5% in 2014 (see Bozio 
et al., 2015 for an overall perspective of the European responses to the crisis, and Marti et al. 
(2015) for the Spanish response to the crisis, Figari et al. (2015) for the Italian case, and Keane 
(2015) for Ireland, with all finding that VAT was one of the main tools for increasing revenues). For 
instance, in the countries that had a bail-out, we found that, after 2008, Hungry increased the 
normal rate by 7 p.p., Spain increased it by 5 p.p., Greece by 4 p.p., and Portugal and Ireland, both 
increased it by 2 p.p. Therefore, we also found evidence of a positive impact of the implicit VAT rate 
on revenues. What was less expected however, was the positive impact of minimum rate. This could 
be explained by the significant increases in minimum rates over the last years. Minimum rates 
increased, on average by 1 p.p. from 2008 to 2012 (from an average of 5.7% in 2007, to an average 
of 6.7% in 2014). However, this represents an average growth of 15%, which compares with 11% 
for the case of the normal rate. For all the three variables, there is some evidence that there is still 
some space in Europe to increase VAT revenues by increasing tax rates. 
Economic environment also has an impact on VAT revenues. We found, a negative impact on the 
variable Imports. On the contrary, countries whose GDP has a higher percentage of services are 
related with higher VAT revenues. This is explained by the higher added value of services when 
compared with industry or agriculture. With regards to the fiscal position of each country, we 
found that higher deficits have a negative impact on VAT revenues.  
Tax administration efficiency is a relevant issue regarding the collection of VAT revenues. All the 
three variables used are positive and statistically significant. Not only does C-efficiency, but also a 
higher number of years also increases revenues. There is some evidence that more experience in 
the administration of this tax (which is measured here by the number of years since VAT was 
introduced) increases the potential for higher revenues. It appears that tax administrations are 
subject to a learning curve in becoming more efficient. Furthermore, a more efficient government 
impacts positively on tax revenues.  
A better legal and institutional environment is also related with a higher capacity for a country to 
collect VAT revenues. Lowering corruption and a higher value in the variable rule of law tends to 
increase revenues. In the case of rule of law, this could be attributed to the fact that conflicts 
between the tax administration and taxpayers can be resolved in court if the legal system is fast, 




reliable, and fair. A strong rule of law appears to have the effect of making taxpayers more compliant, 
thus increasing tax revenues.  
Finally, our control variables do not change the results from our previous models. Additionally, we 
can see that belonging to the Eurozone tends to increase VAT revenues. This could be explained 
by the tighter fiscal rules present in the Eurozone, which make countries more willing to increase 
revenues. A higher GDP per capita (measured by the log function) also increases VAT revenues. 






VAT revenues as % GDP 
VAT rate Positive Positive 
Minimum rate Positive n.s. 
Implicit rate Positive Positive 
Imports Negative Negative 
Services Positive Positive 
Deficit Negative Negative 
C-Efficiency Positive Positive 
Nº years Positive Positive 
Gov. efficiency Positive Positive 
Low Corruption Positive Positive 
Rule of Law Positive Positive 
Euro Positive Positive 
GDP per capita Positive n.s. 
This table summarizes the results of this paper. n.s. stands for ‘not significant’.  
Source: the Author  
Table 7 – Variables results 
Conclusions 
In this paper we assess the critical determinants of VAT revenues in the European Union. By means 
of a panel data of the 27 EU countries, from 1998 to 2011, we test VAT revenues in millions of 
Euros, and VAT revenues as a percentage of GDP. We divided our explanatory variables into 
groups for different categories: 1) VAT rates, using normal rate, minimum rate, and implicit rate; 
2) economic variables, using imports as a percentage of GDP, share of services in GDP, and fiscal 
deficit as a percentage of GDP; 3) Tax administration efficiency, using the C-efficiency ratio, number 
of years since VAT was introduced, and the government efficiency ratio, and; 4) the legal and 
institutional environment, using level of corruption, and the rule of law. Two control variables were 




used to test the robustness of our results, namely: whether the country belongs to the Eurozone, 
and the log of the GDP per capita. 
Results bring to light important issues regarding collecting VAT revenues in the EU, namely that 
tax rates are very relevant, as they increase significantly revenues, even the minimum tax rate. 
Governments have used VAT as a main source of increasing revenues, particularly over the last 
years, due to fiscal consolidation. Another important issue regards tax administration, where 
greater efficiency is a critical determinant for increasing revenues. There is also evidence that tax 
administrations with more years of using VAT tend to have higher revenues. This could represent 
a learning process for the public sector in dealing with this tax. Finally, a lower level of corruption, 
higher compliance, and a better legal and judicial system tend to impact positively on VAT revenues. 
As VAT is increasingly being used by governments in Europe to increase revenues, concern about 
the efficiency of collecting these revenues has grown. This paper address a very relevant topic - 
what determines the collection of VAT revenues? However, the literature is still scarce on this 
aspect, mainly focusing on developing countries, and not Europe. Nonetheless, VAT has been a key 
public policy for all of Europe. This paper should be useful for both academics and practitioners 
alike, and it should help increase our understanding of VAT revenues and their determinants. 
However, further research is still required before concrete conclusions can be reached. Additional 
research on VAT revenues is still needed, using comprehensive data, especially concerning the 
possible relationship between economic shocks and political cycles, along with tax administration 
efficiency and the legal and institutional environment. Thus, it is clear that research on VAT 
revenues is still at an early stage. 
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